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NOTES
THE ECONOMIC CAUSES AND CONSEQUENCES OF
CONSTITUTIONAL REFORM IN EASTERN EUROPE
More than three years have passed since a wave of revolutionary
fervor swept across Eastern Europe. From the exuberant celebra-
tion in Germany at the dismantling of the Berlin Wall to the
bloody uprising in Romania, the people of Eastern Europe revolted
against the economic failure and unfulfilled promises of the com-
munist political and economic systems. The people wanted a gov-
ernment that did not involve itself in every aspect of their lives,
and they wanted an economy capable of providing their most basic
needs.
After three years of democratic reforms and attempts to estab-
lish market-based economic systems in Eastern Europe, however,
many people, particularly members of the rural lower class, are no
longer sure they had the right goals in mind.' Under the former
communists regimes, they had jobs and low prices; now they have
staggering unemployment and hyperinflation.2 In addition, a grow-
ing perception exists among the middle and lower classes that cap-
italism has merely created golden opportunities for profiteers with-
out improving conditions for the average worker.'
In the midst of this struggle between the desire to establish a
market economy and the need to maintain popular support for re-
1. Several Eastern European countries have recently turned to former Communist Party
members for leadership in this difficult time of transition. Eric Bourne, Hardships of Re-
form Return Poll Victories for Ex-Communists, CHRISTIAN ScI. MONITOR, Nov. 24, 1992, at
6. Most notably, in the independent-minded former Soviet republic of Lithuania, the "la-
bor" party, which is composed of former Communist Party members, recently returned to
power after parliamentary elections this past November. Id.
2. See, e.g., Peter Maass, Romanians Nostalgic for Strongman Rule; Voters Again Favor
Former Communist, WASH. POST, Sept. 29, 1992, at A15 (quoting a homeless Romanian wo-
man who claims that if executed tyrant Nicolae Ceausescu were still alive and in power, she
would have a job and could afford sugar and meat).
3. See, e.g., Bourne, supra note 1, at 6 (noting the prevalence of this attitude in Poland).
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form programs, several countries in Eastern Europe have under-
taken the task of drafting new constitutions.4 These documents
will establish not only the fundamental principles upon which new
political systems will be based, but also the fundamental principles
upon which new economic systems must be built.
This Note examines the constitutions of Bulgaria, Albania, and
Romania in an effort to determine whether these countries have
successfully incorporated the fundamental principles of capitalism
into their new political and economic structures. As a foundation
for this analysis, the Note first discusses and contrasts the basic
tenets of capitalism and communism and explains why the relative
"failure" of the communist system gave rise to the massive move-
ment for change across Eastern Europe. Next, this Note provides
an overview of the current economic setting in Eastern Europe,
giving particular treatment to Bulgaria, Albania, and Romania.
With this historic and contemporary perspective in mind, the Note
then examines the new constitutions adopted by these three coun-
tries, 5 analyzing the extent to which these constitutions embody
the fundamental principles of capitalism. Finally, the Note dis-
cusses the prospects for a successful switch to a market economy in
Bulgaria, Albania, and Romania, given the political, economic, and
"constitutional" climate.
ECONOMIC CAUSES OF CONSTITUTIONAL REFORM
IN EASTERN EUROPE
The most fundamental premise of economics is that there are
never enough resources to satisfy the desires of every individual.6
This "scarcity" of resources stems from human beings' nature con-
stantly to want more than they currently possess. 7 Because the
roots of economic scarcity are found in human nature, scarcity is a
condition that transcends all societies, irrespective of their eco-
4. For example, Albania, Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Poland, and Romania have all em-
barked on the constitutional drafting process within the last three and a half years. See Jan
Elster, Constitutionalism in Eastern Europe, 58 U. CHI. L. REv. 447, 447 (1991).
5. At the time of this writing, Albania has yet formally to adopt a new constitution, so the
analysis for this country is based solely on the current draft constitution under con-
sideration.
6. Roy J. RUFFIN & PAUL R. GREGORY, PRINCIPLES OF ECONoMics 31 (2d ed. 1986).
7. Id. at 3.
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nomic systems.8 The logical outgrowth of the constant scarcity of
desirable resources is the widespread presence of self-interest.9 Ec-
onomics itself is defined in terms of scarcity and self-interest: "the
study of how scarce resources are allocated among competing
ends."' 0
A brief examination of the two basic types of economic sys-
tems-capitalism and communism-provides the background for
understanding the economic impetus for constitutional reform in
Eastern Europe. Of course, any particular economic system can be
influenced to some extent by both schools of thought." Therefore,
economic systems exist in a continuum, with pure communism on
the left and pure capitalism on the right.'2 A particular economic
system may fall any place along the continuum but, at some point,
the system is so far to the left that it can no longer be classified as
a market economy 's The question that the reform efforts in East-
ern Europe present is whether these countries have moved far
enough to the right so as to establish a true market economy
Capitalism
Capitalism is "an economic system characterized by private own-
ership of the factors of production, market allocation of resources,
the use of economic incentives, and decentralized decision mak-
ing."' 4 Capitalism operates under the principle that individuals in-
stinctively strive to employ their capital in a fashion that will pro-
8. Richard A. Epstein, All Quiet on the Eastern Front, 58 U. CHI. L. REV. 555, 559, 561
(1991).
9. Id. at 560. Professor Epstein explains that the presence of self-interest results from
the fact that an "individual who practices a form of voluntary and unreciprocated altruism
will have fewer resources at his command than one who follows the dictates of self-interest."
Id. His reasoning, although likely considered cynical by some, is firmly entrenched in the
aforementioned principle that human nature compels people to want more than they have.
10. RUFFIN & GREGORY, supra note 6, at 31.
11. See MILTON FRIEDMAN, MARKET MECHANISMS AND CENTRAL ECONOMIC PLANNING 20
(1981).
12. Id.
13. See id. Professor Friedman acknowledges that although "there is no really satisfactory
substitute for a full-scale use of a free market," there are situations in which a "command"-
type economic system may be desirable. Id.
14. RUFFIN & GREGORY, supra note 6, at 866.
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duce the greatest value to that particular individual. 15 Despite a
person's intention to promote only his own financial interest, inevi-
tably an "invisible hand" guides the individual, promoting the in-
terest of society 16
Self-interest, however, will not always lead to desirable results
for society as a whole. In addition to promoting trade, self-interest
can promote theft.1 In order for the market to work properly, the
legal system must be used to promote trade and deter theft.'" The
extent to which emerging Eastern European countries are able to
utilize their legal systems to harness the forces that drive capital-
ism will have a great impact on their ability to make a prosperous
switch to a market economy
If the countries of Eastern Europe ultimately are successful in
converting to a capitalist economic system, they will reap the bene-
fits associated with a market economy Most notably, the econo-
15. ADAM SMITH, THE WEALTH OF NATIONS 423 (Edwin Cannan ed., Random House 1937)
(5th ed.. 1789).
16. Id. A full discussion of capitalism is beyond the scope of this Note, but the following
example illustrates how the invisible hand operates in the real-world environment:
There are 12 million people living in the environs of New York City, each of
whom is concerned with an infinitesimally small part of getting that city's work
done. Each person is concerned-for the most part-with making a living.
Yet no single person or bureaucracy is in charge of the department-for-mak-
ing-sure-the-city-does-not-starve. The city works by the millions of decentral-
ized decisions of individuals responding to their own cost/benefit calculations.
The price system and supply/demand coordination works so well that no one
loses any sleep over the terrifying prospect of complete breakdown-no one
even gives it a thought.
RUFFIN & GREGORY, supra note 6, at 56.
17. Epstein, supra note 8, at 560.
18. Id. Professor Epstein points out that trade is a "positive sum game" because all par-
ties to the exchange will profit. Id. Theft, on the other hand, is a "negative sum game"
because the winner's gains are less than the loser's losses. Id. Epstein explains that three
,'missions" of a legal system are necessary to ensure that profitable trade wins out over
theft:
The first mission of the legal system is to determine an initial set of property
rights from which subsequent bargains can go forward at a reasonably low cost.
The second mission is to insure that these entitlements once established are
protected against various forms of theft-the office of the law of crime and
tort. The third mission of the law is to facilitate the voluntary exchanges of
property rights-the law of contracts.
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mies of these countries will become significantly more efficient.',
Capitalist economic systems operate more efficiently than socialist
systems because valuable information is constantly communicated
through the price system.20 Because the price system also deter-
mines the distribution of income, information transmitted through
the price system is accompanied by the incentive to act in the most
efficient manner on the information received. 2 When every indi-
vidual in society maximizes the utility of his resources, society as a
whole benefits because total output will approach its maximum
potential.
Entrepreneurship is related to this process of promoting effi-
ciency 22 In an effort to reap greater profits, individuals will try to
produce higher quality goods at a lower cost in order to increase
the attractiveness of their products.23 Although self-interest drives
the individual, society ultimately benefits as higher quality goods
become available at a lower price.
Of course, the countries of Eastern Europe that are moving to-
ward market economies must experience the bad with the good.
Capitalism has its faults. For example, pure capitalism fails to pro-
vide public goods efficiently 24 Capitalism's price system breaks
down with respect to public goods because the benefit an individ-
ual receives from the good is usually indeterminable.2 In addition,
nonpayers in society will inevitably receive the benefits of the pub-
lic good.26 Another major stumbling block on the path to a market
19. The state of "efficiency" is defined in economic terms as "[a] state of affairs in which,
given available knowledge and resources, no change can be made that will make one person
better off without making another worse off." EDWIN G. DOLAN, ECONOMicS 34 (4th ed. 1986).
20. See FRIEDMAN, supra note 11, at 7-8. Professor Friedman states that the price system
serves three functions: 1) it conveys information; 2) it provides "an incentive for people to
adopt the least costly methods of production and to use available resources for the most
highly valued uses"; and 3) it handles the distribution of income. Id.
21. Id. at 8.
22. Entrepreneurship is defined as "the process of looking for new possibilities: making
use of new ways of doing things, being alert to new opportunities, and overcoming old lim-
its." DOLAN, supra note 19, at 34.
23. See id.
24. RUFFIN & GREGORY, supra note 6, at 62. Government typically provides public goods
and services such as public parks, roads and bridges, national defense, and police protection.
Id. at 837.
25. Id. at 62.
26. Id.
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economy in Eastern Europe is capitalism's tendency to widen the
disparities in income distribution." Given the desperate state of
Eastern European economies, an accumulation of wealth in the
hands of relatively few people will likely upset the poorer classes,28
particularly if it is foreigners who are reaping the benefits of the
market economy 2' The fact that uneven income distribution is a
necessary part of harnessing individual self-interest will provide
little consolation to people without jobs who lack money to buy
essentials.30
Communism
Communism, or planned socialism, is "an economic system char-
acterized by state ownership of the factors of production (other
than labor), the use of moral as well as economic incentives, re-
source allocation by economic plan, and centralized decision mak-
ing."'" Whereas capitalism is based on each individual member of
society striving for his own self-interest, communism is based on
individuals consciously working for the benefit of society as a
whole. 2
For the communist system to work efficiently, each citizen must
work diligently for the good of society, regardless of individual eco-
nomic reward.33 This concept, of course, contradicts the fundamen-
tal principle of human nature that people always will want more
than they have.3 4 Under a communist economic system, the incen-
27. Id. at 62, 784-91.
28. As previously noted, this feeling is already beginning to arise. See supra note 3 and
accompanying text.
29. See Linnet Myers, In East Europe, There's More Than One Capitalist Road, CHL
TRIB., Oct. 25, 1992, at C1 (describing complaints in Poland that the government's privatiza-
tion efforts entailed "selling out" to foreigners).
30. Another related downside to a capitalist system is macroeconomic instability-the
strong tendency that a capitalist economy will experience cyclical upturns and downturns.
RUFFIN & GREGORY, supra note 6, at 63. This potential instability will likely add to popular
disapproval of capitalism if a severe economic downturn is experienced in a young capitalist
state.
31. Id. at 866.
32. Karl Marx defined communism by the principle: "From each according to his abilities,
to each according to his needs." Karl Marx, Critique of the Gotha Programme, in 24 KARL
MARX, FREDERICK ENGELS: COLLECTED WORKS 75, 87 (1989).
33. GORDON B. SMITH, SOVIET POLITICS: CONTINUITY AND CONTRADICTION 37 (1988).
34. See supra notes 6-10 and accompanying text.
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tive for the individual efficiently to produce more disappears. No
matter how hard the individual works, he will receive personally
only what the state allocates to him, not what he has earned. 5
Communism conveniently sidesteps the problem of a lack of in-
dividual incentive by presupposing an abundant supply of re-
sources that can satisfy the demands of every citizen as well as
provide the capital investment necessary to keep the economy
growing. 8 The presupposition is inherently false. If individuals al-
ways want more than they have, no quantity of supply can meet
the demands of each individual. 7
Communism enjoys some theoretical advantages over capitalism,
but most of these advantages are based on the misguided notion
that the system in its purest form actually could work in the long
run. Nikita Khrushchev once said that when true communism was
achieved, workers would be able to visit the store and take as
much bread as they needed without having to pay for it.", In the-
ory, this abundance of resources would extend to all consumer
goods as well as health care and education. Karl Marx believed
that, in addition to its economic rewards, communism was the
highest stage of social and political development. 9 Under a com-
munist system, class distinctions would disappear because all the
means of production would be held in common ownership. 40 With-
out class distinctions, citizens would be free from exploitation and
35. Professor Friedman argues that although information is transmitted in a "command"
economy from one level to another, the information is not accompanied by any incentive to
act in accordance with it. FRIEDMAN, supra note 11, at 8. This is a major distinguishing
feature between communism and capitalism; in a market economy, information flowing
through the price system is accompanied by the incentive to act on that information. See
supra notes 20-21 and accompanying text.
36. SMITH, supra note 33, at 37.
37. Recent history has shown that this is one of the most devastating failures of commu-
nism. Not only was communism unable to satisfy every demand of each individual in soci-
ety, it was unable to satisfy even the basic needs of its citizens, including food, clothing, and
shelter. See infra notes 60-64 and accompanying text.
38. SMITH, supra note 33, at 37 (citing PRAVDA, Jan. 28, 1959).
39. See KARL MARx & FRIEDRICH ENGELS, COMMUNIST MANIFESTO ("In place of the old
bourgeois society, with its classes and class antagonisms, we shall have an association, in
which the free development of each is the condition for the free development of all."), re-
printed in HAROLD J. LASKI, KARL MARx, at 59, 82 (1933); see also SMITH, supra note 33, at
38 (providing an overview of Marx's core ideology).
40. MARx & ENGELS, supra note 39 ("The proletariat will centralize all instruments
of production in the hands of the State "), reprinted in LASKI, supra note 39, at 81.
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coercion and, therefore, would be able to maximize their freedom
and express themselves creatively "' As class distinctions withered
away, so would internal class tensions.42 With no ruling class using
governmental power to protect its own interests, ultimately all
state institutions would disappear.4 From this perspective, propo-
nents of communism argue that their system is more advanced
than capitalism. 44
The disadvantages and failures of communism are more readily
apparent than its advantages and successes. Most notably, the
centralized planning mechanisms 45 necessary to oversee communist
economies have been subjected to strong politicization 46 as well as
gross incompetence. 7 History also has shown that by vitiating the
individual's incentive to produce,48 communism has resulted
in shortages of supply,49 poor quality products, 50 and low pro-
41. See id., reprinted in LASKI, supra note 39, at 75, 81.
42. See id. §§ I-II (describing the relationship between existing proletarian groups to
communists and the benefit of creating one unified group), reprinted in LASKI, supra note
39, at 59-82.
43. Gordon Smith describes Marx's belief that there would be "no courts, no law, and no
police, because these are merely tools used by one class to subjugate other classes." SMrrH,
supra note 33, at 37.
44. Id.
45. Central planning was not a fundamental principle of Marxism. Not until 1928, when
Stalin introduced the first Five Year Plan, did centralized state planning become a promi-
nent feature in the Soviet economy. Id. at 189.
46. Republics and regional officials pushed for proposals benefiting their respective areas
much as United States Congressmen fight over lucrative federal government contracts. Id.
at 195.
47. Most of the incompetency and inefficiency in centrally planned economic systems
stems from pressure to fulfill production quotas set by the central agency. The classic exam-
ple of this "success indicator" problem is the "May Day Nail Factory"
If the output of the May Day Nail Factory is specified in the plan in terms of
the number of nails produced, this will encourage factory managers to produce
small tacks. On the other hand, if output is specified in terms of the gross
weight of nails produced, it is more advantageous for the factory to produce
railroad spikes.
Id. at 198.
48. Alex Kozinski, The Dark Lessons of Utopia, 58 U. CHI. L. REV. 575, 578 (1991)
("Without a price system to allocate resources and create incentives, there is no way to
match up supply and demand.").
49. See SMITH, supra note 33, at 199 (discussing the lack of spare parts in the Soviet
Union and the hoarding of parts by individuals in response to the problem).
50. See id. at 191 (discussing how economic plans stressed quantity over quality).
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ductivity 51
The Economic Failure of Communism
The history of communism in Eastern Europe has been de-
scribed as "a gradual process of losing popular legitimacy rather
than never having it. ' '52 In its early days, communism enjoyed
some rather astounding successes. For example, between the late
1920s and the mid-1930s, the national income of the Soviet Union
experienced growth rates estimated at fourteen to eighteen per-
cent.5 3 As early as the 1960s, however, communist leaders in East-
ern Europe began to realize the failure of their economic system.54
They knew that without economic performance, they could not
maintain their political legitimacy 55 At the same time, the neces-
sary reforms would have forced the communists to forfeit their ide-
als and their position of power. 6
In an effort to maintain control, communist leaders in Eastern
Europe adopted a system of economic and social controls similar to
that already in place in the Soviet Union.57 By the late 1980s, how-
ever, with the economic situation worsening and support from
Moscow shrinking 5 s communist leaders in Eastern Europe could
not maintain their grip on power. 9
The driving force behind this revolutionary wave in Eastern Eu-
rope in the late 1980s was the complete breakdown of communism
as an economic system. In addition to the insufficient supplies of
51. RUFFIN & GREGORY, supra note 6, at 876 & n.4 (explaining that American industrial
workers produce roughly twice as much as Soviet industrial workers and that the Soviet
economy produces only 60% as much output per unit of input as the American economy
does).
52. Wiktor Osiatynski, Revolutions in Eastern Europe, 58 U. CHI. L. REV. 823, 831 (1991)
(reviewing TIMOTHY G. ASH, THE MAGIC LANTERN: THE REVOLUTION OF '89 WITNESSED IN
WARSAW, BUDAPEST, BERLIN, AND PRAGUE (1990); WILLIAM ECHIKSON, LIGHTING THE NIGHT:
REVOLUTION IN EASTERN EUROPE (1990)).
53. SMITH, supra note 33, at 190.
54. Osiatynski, supra note 52, at 848-49.
55. Id. at 848.
56. Id. at 849.
57. Id. at 850.
58. Id.
59. Id. at 854.
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food and clothing,60 people under communist rule endured chronic
housing shortages. 1 Even countries like East Germany, which ap-
peared relatively prosperous, are now referred to as an "economic
disaster zone."62 Bulgaria, Albania, and Romania rank among the
countries having the worst standards of living in Eastern Europe.63
The overwhelming failure of communist economics and the current
state of affairs has been likened to the process of a Chapter 11
reorganization.6 4
Beyond the economic problems, however, communism also failed
as a political and social institution. Alex Kozinski, a former resi-
dent of Romania and currently a judge on the United States Court
of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, believes that despite the eco-
nomic woes in Eastern Europe, socialism might have succeeded
had it achieved its promise of a "happier, more tranquil, less har-
ried existence."65 Instead, the social realities of communist regimes
provided socialism its greatest failure. Judge Kozinski wrote, "By
every conceivable standard, collectivist states fell short of their ex-
pectations, failing to provide even a minimally acceptable quality
of life for their citizens.
66
60. Kozinski, supra note 48, at 578 (citing PAUL C. ROBERTS & KAREN LAFOLLETIE,
MELTDOWN: INSIDE THE SOVIET ECONOMY 7-74 (1990)). Discussing the struggle for food in the
Soviet Union, Roberts and LaFollette state:
Even the homeless on the streets of urban America, if they wished, could read-
ily obtain edible cabbages, potatoes, bread, animal fat, sugar, salt, the occa-
sional soup bone, and dairy products-the basic Soviet diet-from the garbage
bins of grocery stores. Indeed, the American poor eat much better than this.
ROBERTS & LAFOLLETTE, supra, at 44.
61. The notoriously shoddy government-supplied housing in the Soviet Union provided
about 97 square feet of living space per capita in Moscow and 75 square feet in the rest of
the country. ROBERTS & LAFOLLETTE, supra note 60, at 52.
62. Gerhard Casper, European Convergence, 58 U. CHI. L. REv. 441, 444 (1991). Professor
Casper explains that respectable Western publications ranking East Germany among the
world's leading industrial economies were fooled by fraudulent statistics that suggested East
Germany was a model of socialism that actually worked. Id.
63. Albania has the worst standard of living in Eastern Europe, see infra note 114 and
accompanying text, followed by Bulgaria, and then Romania. See infra notes 103-10, 126-30
and accompanying text.
64. Casper, supra note 62, at 444 (characterizing the Round Table Talks that preceded
governmental change in most of the Eastern European countries as "somewhat reminiscent
of bankrupt management asking creditors for forbearance").
65. Kozinski, supra note 48, at 579.
66. Id.
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More important than understanding that these failures occurred,
however, is understanding why these failures occurred. Identifying
the causes of the communist downfall is essential because the tran-
sition to a capitalist economic system will not occur instantane-
ously.67 As countries attempt the prolonged transformation toward
market economies, many of the former communist ideas likely will
remain in place."' The remainder of this section examines these
residual communist principles, explaining how they caused the fail-
ure of communism and how they might poison the move to a mar-
ket economy
As discussed, communism is based on the principle that each in-
dividual should work for the benefit of society as a whole.6 9 Com-
munism, however, fails to account adequately for the fact that
human nature compels individuals to want more than they have. 0
Recent history has shown that the net result of this contradiction
is that the individual is provided no incentive to produce effi-
ciently, 1 for he is unable to reap the rewards of his efforts.
Given a system devoid of individual incentive, communist gov-
ernments must establish some type of "department-for-making-
sure-the-country-does-not-starve, ' '7 because without individual in-
centive, the invisible hand will not automatically perform this
function. 3 Marx failed to explain exactly how communism should
replace the impetus of individual incentive and the workings of the
invisible hand.74 Most of his writings contain only vague descrip-
tions of the operation of socialist society 75 Stalin attempted to
solve this problem by introducing central planning in 1928 in an
67. Epstein, supra note 8, at 570. Professor Epstein notes that the strong socialist tradi-
tions in Eastern Europe make it unlikely that the public will make a "radical transforma-
tion" and adopt true "laissez-faire capitalism." Id.
68. Strong evidence indicates that the transformation has already begun. See infra notes
191-97, 200-18 and accompanying text (detailing provisions in the new constitutions of Bul-
garia, Albania, and Romania that exemplify the carryover of basic communist principles).
69. See supra note 32 and accompanying text.
70. See supra notes 6-10 and accompanying text.
71. SMITH, supra note 33, at 213.
72. See supra note 16. In the former Soviet Union, this "department" was called Gosplan.
SMITH, supra note 33, at 194.
73. See supra notes 15-16 and accompanying text.
74. SMITH, supra note 33, at 37.
75. Id.
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effort rapidly to industrialize the Soviet economy 76 In the long
run, however, central planning became such a great failure that in-
stead of overseeing and stimulating a prosperous economy, it
merely exacerbated the problems caused by the lack of individual
incentive. With no personal economic incentive to produce quality
goods at low cost, output quotas set through central planning pro-
vided the only impetus for production.77 This focus resulted in
chronic shortages of spare parts and input resources, 78 shoddy
workmanship,79 low productivity," and in many cases, a complete
disregard for the environment.8
With the advent of computers, the Soviets thought the logistical
problems of central planning could be solved.2 Scientists thought
that in the future the entire Soviet Union could be linked by a
massive computer network that would issue commands coordinat-
ing all of the economic units to ensure optimal utilization of re-
sources.83 The idea was thwarted, however, when a group of mathe-
maticians in Kiev calculated that drafting a plan of material-
technical supply for just one year for the Ukrainian Republic alone
76. Id. at 189.
77. Id. at 213.
78. Id. at 199. Chronic shortages of spare parts forced producers to "cannibalize" portions
of their production capacity. Id. "Cannibalization" refers to the ubiquitous practice in state
farms and factories of keeping available an entire tractor, or other piece of machinery, for
the purpose of providing spare parts. Id.
Chronic shortages of input materials resulted in widespread hoarding of resources in the
Soviet Union. Id. Factory managers would hoard raw materials to protect against the fre-
quent disruption in supply of resources. Id. Soviet production facilities also often hoarded
labor year-round so they would have sufficient human capital during the final months of a
plan when the facility would "storm" to meet its targets. Id. Soviet factory managers were
also forced to hoard labor to compensate for the estimated 20% of the labor force that
would arrive drunk or not show up at all. Id.
79. In hurried attempts to fulfill plans, factories have been known to turn out "finished"
automobiles without headlights, taillights, or windshield wipers because the plant ran out of
these parts. Id.
80. See id. (discussing the low productivity of communist workers resulting from lack of
economic initiative). Another major cause of low productivity was the cannibalization and
hoarding of resources. See supra note 78.
81. See, e.g., Bettina Boxall, Eastern Europeans Seek Advice on Environment, L.A.
TIMES, Sept. 18, 1990, at B3. Roberts and LaFollette discovered that all of the major seas
and lakes in the Soviet Union are dying, and drinking water is scarce in many regions.
ROBERTS & LAFOLLETTE, supra note 60, at 33.
82. SMITH, supra note 33, at 192.
83. Id.
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would require the services of the entire world population for a pe-
riod of ten million years."4
After forty-five years of individuals' having no incentive to pro-
duce efficiently, working under the supervision of poor central
planning, focusing solely on output quotas, and neglecting the en-
vironmental impact of communism's pursuit of the ideal society,
negative remnants of the communist system will not disappear
overnight.8 5 These remnants pose a major hurdle to the adoption
of a capitalist economy in Eastern Europe. "Revolutions" are typi-
cally only the starting point for a much longer revolutionary pro-
cess.8 6 Wiktor 0siatynski points out that this extended transforma-
tion of political and economic structures usually "takes more time,
pain, and blood than the original assault on the pre-revolutionary
establishment. 81 7 The greatest problem facing every revolution is
how to placate the frustrated expectations of those who must make
sacrifices in the name of reforms and future progress.8
In Eastern Europe, this problem of dealing with frustrated ex-
pectations will likely resurface as a result of the current economic
conditions.89 As these countries search for democracy, by definition
they should begin to be governed by the will of the majority In an
impoverished country, however, the will of the majority typically
demands rapid economic improvement 0 rather than patient re-
form.91 Unfortunately, a market economy cannot be established
overnight, nor will it lead to immediate improvements in the stan-
dard of living. 2 The initial steps toward a capitalist economic sys-
tem-typically unfreezing prices and cutting government expendi-
84. Id. (citing O.K. ANTONov, DLIA VSEKH i DLIA SEBIA: 0 SOVERSHENSTVOVANII POKA-
ZATELEI PLANIROVANIIA SOTSIALISTICHESKOGO PROMYSHLENNOGO PROIZVODSTvA 23 (1965)).
The estimate likely overstates the challenge, but the problem remains clear.
85. See supra notes 67-68 and accompanying text.
86. Osiatynski, supra note 52, at 853.
87. Id.
88. Id.
89. Id. at 854.
90. Id.
91. Professor Osiatynski explains that this process has already taken place to a certain
extent in Poland. Id.
92. Id.
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tures-alone are enough to send living conditions in Eastern
European countries into a further tailspin.9 3
CURRENT ECONOMIC CLIMATE IN EASTERN EUROPE
The current economic troubles of Eastern Europe are well docu-
mented. Of particular concern to the future of free market reforms,
however, is the fact that the economy of the region continues to
decline.94 Unemployment has risen to levels not seen since World
War II, and the collective gross national product for the region
has declined rapidly 95 Further exacerbating the problems of the
fledgling economies of Eastern Europe is the fact that forty-five
years of communism have resulted in economies that cannot pro-
duce goods of sufficient quality to compete on world markets9" and
that cannot respond to competitive pressures."
The economic outlook for Eastern Europe, however, may not be
so gloomy as current conditions may indicate. The newly demo-
cratic nations present significant opportunities for foreign invest-
ment and economic growth.98 The markets of Eastern Europe offer
sixty-four million new consumers99 "with enough pent-up demand
to empty a host of Wal-Marts in a single afternoon."'100 As a pre-
requisite to mass consumption, however, these countries must es-
tablish an income base. The communist legacy guarantees the diffi-
93. Further accentuating this problem is the fact that the workers and peasants are
likely to bear the biggest burden of the economic reforms. Id.
94. The current experiment with capitalism in Eastern Europe has been referred to as
"an excellent advertisement for the virtues of Communism." Paul Hofheinz, New Light in
Eastern Europe?, FoRTUNE, July 29, 1991, at 145, 145.
95. The gross national product declined an average of 7.3% in 1991. Id. (citing
PlanEcon, a Washington, D.C. consulting firm). Others estimate a 17% fall in the region's
economic output since 1989. Patrick Worsnip, East European Troubles Prompt Rethink of
Western Policy, REUTER LIaR. REP., Oct. 22, 1991, at 1, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library,
LBYRPT file.
96. Worsnip, supra note 95, at 2.
97. Hofheinz, supra note 94, at 145. Hofheinz notes that even the Eastern Europeans
underestimated how uncompetitive their industries had become. Id.
98. See, e.g., Tyler Marshall & Carol J. Williams, Regional Outlook/Eastern Europe; A
Time to Build, A Time to Destroy; The Economic Gloom and Doom of the Post-Communist
Era Is Beginning to Give Way to a Tentative Optimism, L.A. TiMES, Jan. 26, 1993, at 1.
99. Hofheinz, supra note 94, at 146 (counting only consumers in countries with essen-
tially convertible currencies).
100. Id.
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culty of this task as well: "Primitive commercial mechanisms,
crumbling infrastructures, murky property rights and the absence
of a market mentality make every move complex." 101 The problem
is, unfortunately, circular. Poor economic conditions limit con-
sumption, thereby driving down profit potential and consequently
discouraging potential investors. 10 2 Without new investment, there
will be no source of income to drive consumption.
Economic Environment in Bulgaria
The current state of the economy of Bulgaria presents a hostile
environment for capitalism to take root. Ninety percent of the
economy is still state owned and growth in the private sector is
stagnant.10 3 Economic production has decreased thirty percent
since 1989, unemployment is climbing, and the annual inflation
rate is nearly five hundred percent.104 In addition, the Bulgarian
economy was more closely tied to the Soviet economy than any
other Eastern European country 105 When the Soviet economy col-
lapsed, demand for Bulgarian exports disappeared.10 6 Like most
Eastern European countries, Bulgaria has found little demand for
its products in the West.107 Bulgaria also relies upon nuclear reac-
tors for its energy needs, a situation that has been described as a
"catastrophe[ ] waiting to happen."'' 0 The lack of a vocal Western
lobby and a "disastrous geographical location" further complicates
the political and economic future of Bulgaria. 09 New laws passed
by the Bulgarian Parliament have failed to initiate .economic
101. Wendy Cooper & Harvey D. Shapiro, The Privatization of Prwatization, INSTITU-
TIONAL INV. (Int'l ed.), Oct. 1991, at 87, 92.
102. Worsnip, supra note 95, at 2 (quoting Jonathan Eyal of Britain's Royal United Ser-
vices Institute).
103. R.C. Longworth, Bulgaria Gets Few Points for Progress, CHL TRiB., Oct. 25, 1991, at
C1.
104. Id.
105. Id.
106. Id.
107. Id.
108. Turnabout in Bulgaria, GAZETTE (Montreal), Oct. 17, 1991, at B2. The risk related to
these reactors was exacerbated after the November, 1989 revolution, when a significant
number of Bulgaria's nuclear experts emigrated to the West for more lucrative jobs. Carol J.
Williams, Skilled Workers Suffer as Bulgaria Steps Back in Time, LA. TIMEs, Jan. 14,
1992, at 2.
109. Longworth, supra note 103, at C1.
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growth and have created a climate suited only for the investor
'with iron nerves and a long-term view' "11
Prospects for Bulgaria, however, are not hopeless. Bulgaria's
electrical engineering and information-technology sectors have in
the past produced relatively high-quality goods for the Soviet
space program."' In addition, Bulgaria's food industry boasts ex-
tremely low labor costs and worker educational levels often higher
than those in Britain." 2 The reputation of Bulgarians "for a dour
steadiness, a financial flair and a willingness to work hard if neces-
sary" has also fostered foreign optimism."'
Economic Environment in Albania
Albania represents the greatest challenge to proponents of capi-
talism in Eastern Europe. Albania suffers the worst standard of
living in Eastern Europe" 4 and is the least developed country in
the former Eastern bloc." 5 Albanians suffer chronic shortages of
eggs, milk, meat, and most consumer goods; the country's markets
are even short of native fruits and vegetables. 1 6 Unemployment
approaches thirty-three percent, and Albania's national income de-
creased fifty-five percent in the first six months of 1991 alone.""
Albania's geographic isolation from most western markets com-
pounds the country's problems."' The country has only one rail-
road line, one harbor, and one airport."9 Basic business technology
110. Prwatization in Bulgaria May Accelerate After October Elections, BNA INT'L
TRADE DAILY, Sept. 16, 1991 (quoting a foreign observer who requested anonymity), availa-
ble in LEXIS, Nexis Library, BNAITD file, at *3.
111. Cooper & Shapiro, supra note 101, at 93 (citing Paul Reynolds, leader of the Mont-
crieff Consortium, a British management consulting and accounting group specializing in
Eastern Europe).
112. Id. (citing Paul Reynolds).
113. Longworth, supra note 103, at Cl.
114. Laura Silber, Albania Sets Out to Attract Foreign Investors, FIN. TIMES, Jan. 2,
1991, § I, at 2.
115. Jack Dolan, Albania Takes Step on Road Toward Market Economy, E. EUR. REP.,
Oct. 14, 1991, at 2, 3 (noting that Albania's economic problems are most evident-in its un-
derdeveloped infrastructure).
116. Eric Bourne, Albania Tackles Reform, Amid Fears of Famine, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONI-
TOR, Aug. 13, 1991, at 3.
117. Joe Ortiz, Albanians Strip Trees Bare for Firewood, LA. TIMES, Jan. 5, 1992, at A22.
118. Dolan, supra note 115, at 3.
119. Id.
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is primitive. For instance, the Albanian telephone network was
linked to the international network just two years ago. 120
Although the short-term economic outlook in Albania appears
bleak, 121 the country is not totally devoid of economic opportunity
Albania possesses one of Europe's richest oil reserves,' 2 in addi-tion to valuable minerals 23 and other resources. 124 Some have even
proposed that Albania's Mediterranean climate could provide lu-
crative opportunities for investment in tourism. 12 5
Economic Environment in Romania
As in Bulgaria and Albania, the implementation of capitalism in
Romania will prove a challenging task. Economic growth fell 20%
in 19902 and an additional 22.3% in 1991.127 Industrial produc-
tion is declining monthly and agricultural performance has been
characterized as an "embarrassment to [the] Romanians. ''12s As
with the other Balkan states, Romania suffers staggering rates of
inflation, presently over two hundred percent. 29 Despite rising
prices, many goods are still unavailable. Milk, for example, is avail-
able to only one-third of the people living in Bucharest. 30
Compounding Romania's problems is the fact that most
Romanians are unwilling to work harder to offset the higher
prices.' They increasingly refuse to work. 3 2 In fact, a recent sur-
120. Id.
121. See, e.g., Hofheinz, supra note 94, at 150 (blaming ethnic strife and political instabil-
ity for turning potential investments into "nightmares").
122. Occidental Petroleum is already drilling for oil and gas off the coast of Albania. Do-
lan, supra note 115, at 4.
123. Albania's most notable mineral reserves are chrome and copper. Id.
124. Bourne, supra note 116, at 4.
125. Dolan, supra note 115, at 3 (citing Albanian foreign minister, Muhamet Kapllani).
126. Jonathan Lynn, Romania Puts Finishing Touches to Reforms, REUTERS, July 2,
1991, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, MONRPT file, at *3.
127. Joachim Sonnenberg, Romanian Economy Sinking, Cmi. TRIB., Jan. 19, 1992, at 8A.
128. Id. Romanians believe that their country could be a major agricultural force in Eu-
rope given its vast amount of fertile land. Id.
129. Peter Humphrey, Romanian Crisis Deepens as Inflation Breaks 200 Percent,
REUTERS, Oct. 30, 1991, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, MONRPT file, at *1. Inflation
of food prices is even higher, over 250% m October 1991. Id. at *2. Wages have also in-
creased, but only by 159%. Id.
130. Sonnenberg, supra note 127, at 8A.
131. Id.
132. Id.
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vey conducted by the European Community found that only a mi-
nority of Romanians agreed that moving toward a market economy
would lead to progress. 133 One commentator noted that "Romania
is especially vulnerable, since it is neither clear that its leaders re-
ally wish to implement true reforms nor that people understand
the need and meaning of privatization.' ' 13 4
Nonetheless, Romania provides some optimism for the develop-
ment of capitalism. The nation's primary advantages-its large
size and raw resources-give it the potential to become one of the
most prosperous Balkan states.' 35 Despite the lack of readily iden-
tifiable business opportunities, Dr. Keith Crane, research director
with PlanEcon Inc., predicted that new investment in Romania
would climb to $200 million in 1992, up from only $150 million in
1991.1"6 The relatively low cost of entering the emerging market
and establishing a regional market share, as compared with West-
ern Europe, has contributed to this rapid increase in investment.3 7
CONSTITUTIONAL REFORM IN EASTERN EUROPE
The close interrelationship between economic rights and individ-
ual rights and privileges means that a successful shift to demo-
cratic values requires a concurrent shift to a market economy 138
The foundational ingredients for this successful transformation to
a capitalist economy will be the stability and permanence of prop-
133. Ray Moseley, E. Europe Wants Faster Reform, Survey Finds, CHI. TRm., Jan. 29,
1992, at C2. Romania was the only country in Eastern Europe surveyed in which a majority
of the people did not support a move to a market economy. Id.
134. Juliana Pilon, Romania Waiting at the Gate?, WASH. TIMES, Nov. 8, 1991, at F4.
135. Daniel Nelson, Sword of Damocles Hangs over Romania, S.F CHRON., Nov. 6, 1991,
at A25.
136. Guy Halverson, Western Firms Get a Foot in the Door in Eastern Europe, CHRIS-
TIAN SCI. MONITOR, Feb. 10, 1992, at 7.
137. Id. Coca-Cola is a prime example of a company investing in Eastern Europe in the
hopes of expanding its international market share. As part of international investment strat-
egy, Coca-Cola is currently involved in a joint venture in Romania. Eben Shapiro, Coca-
Cola's Earnings and Stock Climb, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 31, 1992, at D1.
138. See MILTON FRIEDMAN, CAPITALISM AND FREEDOM 7-21 (1962). Professor Friedman
argues that economics and politics are closely interrelated and that only certain types of
political and economic systems can be combined. Id. at 7-8. In his opinion a socialist eco-
nomic system cannot be combined with a democratic form of government. Id. at 8.
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erty rights 39 and new governmental institutions. 4 This section
surveys the new constitutions of Bulgaria, Albania, and Romania
and specifically examines their treatment of private property rights
and other basic capitalist principles. It also includes an examina-
tion of various constitutional provisions that may threaten the sta-
bility of the new governments and thereby threaten the successful
operation of their market economies.'
41
Treatment of Property Rights
The establishment of concrete property rights provides the foun-
dation upon which Eastern Europe must build its emerging capi-
talist economies. Without private ownership rights in land, raw
materials, and means of production, the move to a market econ-
omy cannot succeed. 42 Private and transferable property rights are
essential for giving individuals an equal opportunity to carve out a
better life for themselves, to make the most efficient use of their
scarce resources, and to reap the benefits of their diligence and en-
trepreneurship directly 143 Without these motivating factors, the
emerging capitalist economies of Eastern Europe will surely fail,
likely toppling the fledgling democratic regimes in the process.
Unfortunately, the prospects for successful privatization in East-
ern Europe are dim. One of the major problems facing the coun-
tries in Eastern Europe is their "inability to forge a durable social
consensus on the necessity of strong institutions of private prop-
139. Epstein, supra note 8, at 569. Property rights serve as the foundation for business
transactions. Without stable and easily determinable property interests, capitalist exchanges
will be seriously hampered. See supra note 18 and accompanying text.
140. Political risk is "[t]he probability that changes in government laws or regulations
will result in a lower rate of return of the investment or, in the extreme case, a total loss of
the invested capital." PETER S. ROSE, MONEY AND CAPITAL MARKETS 828 (1989). The greater
the political risk is in these emerging capitalist markets, the harder it will be for these coun-
tries to attract foreign investment.
141. Full examination of these "instability provisions" is outside the scope of this Note.
Therefore, the Note focuses predominately on "affirmative rights" provisions that will create
enormous economic strain on the new governments, rather than on the separation-of-powers
issues, checks-and-balances problems, election provisions, and amendment procedures that
also have the potential to impact the stability of the new governments.
142. Private ownership of the means of production and the ability to reap personal finan-
cial gain from one's efforts are among the hallmarks of a capitalist market economy. See,
e.g., HARRY D. HUTCHINSON, ECONOMICS AND SOCIAL GOALS: AN INTRODUCTION 75-79 (1973).
143. Id.
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erty for both political liberty and economic growth.' 14 4 Gerhard
Casper characterized the possibility of guaranteeing Eastern
Europeans the meaningful right to hold private property as "highly
dubious. '145
The uncertainty over property rights is compounded by disa-
greement as to which path these countries should follow to achieve
denationalization of the economy, and which path they should fol-
low once privatization is complete. 146 The increasing movement to
slow the transition to a market economy represents one of the
greatest dangers facing the countries of Eastern Europe.147 If the
transition is slow and drawn out, these countries will remain unat-
tractive to risk-averse investors. 14 In such an atmosphere, only in-
vestments that yield high short-term returns will flow into Eastern
Europe. 49 The nations of Eastern Europe must, therefore, fully
and quickly embrace the principles of capitalism and provide an
environment in which capitalism can grow and prosper. The new
constitutions adopted by these countries provide the perfect forum
to demonstrate to foreign investors that the countries of Eastern
Europe are serious about making a dramatic switch to a market
economy Any attempt to lengthen the process in order to soften
the blow of the transition will directly promote the failure of capi-
talism and democracy in Eastern Europe. 50
144. Epstein, supra note 8, at 557.
145. Casper, supra note 62, at 445.
146. Epstein, supra note 8, at 570.
147. Poland is a prime example of a country that made great strides toward achieving a
market economy but has now decided to scale back reforms in order to lessen the sting of
the transition. See Stephen Engelberg, Poland Again Saddles up the Steed of Reform, N.Y.
TIMES, Feb. 16, 1992, at 14. Professor Epstein identifies the dangers of making a slow transi-
tion to a market economy as the "perils of prudence." Epstein, supra note 8, at 570.
148. Epstein points out that investors are willing to wait a longer period of time before
receiving a return on their investment only "when the legal environment is stable, when the
regulatory structure is predictable, and when the tax burdens are ascertainable." Epstein,
supra note 8, at 570.
149. Id. at 571. Epstein notes that this type of investing will lead the citizens of Eastern
Europe to perceive investors as mere speculators, causing popular resentment toward the
capitalist system. Id.
150. Id. Epstein calls the danger of proceeding slowly toward a capitalist system "The
Failure of Gradualism." Id. at 570. He points out that "an attitude of 'there's no going back'
drastically improves the chances of success." Id. at 571.
[Vol. 34:13671386
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Bulgaria
Articles 17 and 18 of Bulgaria's constitution are the principle
provisions affecting property rights.151 Article 17 enunciates the
principle that private property rights shall be inviolable. 152 This is
clearly the proper starting point for fostering an environment con-
ducive to the establishment of a capitalist economic system. An
earlier draft version of this article granted the government the
power to establish laws regulating the uses of property "with a
view to ensuring its social role.11 53 If the government were to take
an active role in determining how property should be used to maxi-
mize social value, individuals would be denied the opportunity to
decide for themselves how best to utilize their resources. Choices
concerning the use of scarce resources would be based on political
151. The full text of Article 17 states:
(1) The law guarantees and protects the right to property and inheritance.
(2) Property may be private or public.
(3) Private property is inviolable.
(4) The management of state and township property is established by law.
(5) Expropriation of property in order to meet state or township needs must be
according to law and provided that such need cannot be satisfied in any other
way. Suitable compensation must be paid in advance.
BULG. CONsT. art. 17.
Article 18 provides:
(1) The state is the sole owner of all underground resources, the coastal
beaches, public roadways, waters, forests and parks of national significance,
natural preserves, and archaeological sites, as defined by law.
(2) The state has sovereign rights over the continental shelf and the exclusive
economic zone for the study, development, utilization, preservation, and man-
agement of biological, mineral, and energy resources of such maritime areas.
(3) The state has sovereign rights over the radio-frequency spectrum and loca-
tions of the geostationary orbit assigned to the Republic of Bulgaria by inter-
national agreements.
(4) A state monopoly may be established by law over railroad transportation,
national postal and telecommunications networks, the utilization of nuclear
power, the production of radioactive items, weapons, explosives, and biologi-
cally potent substances.
(5) The conditions and procedures according to which the state may grant con-
cessions for various projects and permits for activities as per the preceding
paragraphs are regulated by law.
(6) State property is cared for and managed in the interest of citizens and
society.
Id. art. 18.
152. Id. art. 17, § 3.
153. BULG. CONST. art. 15, § 3 (Draft, 1991).
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factors and not on the operation of a real price system. The draft-
ers of Bulgaria's. constitution took a significant step towards estab-
lishing a market economy by amending the original version of Arti-
cle 17 before the constitution was ratified.
Article 18, however, provokes concern because it overtly states
that important factors of production will remain state property 154
The government's exclusive ownership of natural resources would
severely hamper a privately run business in Bulgaria, for example.
A single source of supply means no competition and only one price.
Businesses will be denied the opportunity to choose a supplier who
can deliver the same materials at a cheaper price. By the same to-
ken, the government, which controls the only source of supply, will
have no incentive to find cheaper methods to deliver materials be-
cause it will have no fear of losing domestic buyers to other compa-
nies in the same industry As a result, industries in Bulgaria re-
quiring large amounts of natural resources will not be able to
compete with companies outside of Bulgaria that are able to buy
their resources from the most efficient producer and in turn pro-
duce their finished goods for less.'55
Additionally, the governmental claims to ownership of natural
resources, both on land and offshore, close the door on private in-
vestment in what could be Bulgaria's most lucrative economic sec-
tor. 5' Western technology is clearly more advanced and more effi-
cient at utilizing these resources. The Bulgarian government is not
only preventing the inflow of this technology, but it is also prevent-
ing new jobs that would be created by Western firms entering the
industry
The final section of Article 18 attempts to quell these fears by
requiring the state to manage its assets for the benefit of society 157
154. See BULG. CONST. art. 18, §§ 1-2; see supra note 151.
155. Bulgarian companies may have the option of importing natural resources that are
produced more efficiently elsewhere, but the price of transportation of the resources, (not to
mention any tariffs that might be levied to protect Bulgaria's inefficient domestic produc-
tion) will add to the Bulgarian company's costs.
156. As are the other Balkan states, Bulgaria is relatively well endowed with natural re-
sources that could produce a solid foundation for the emerging market economy. See Karen
Taylor, Bulgarian Mines Flounder in Market Economy - Domestic Shipments Have Fallen
by 60% over the Past Two Years, FIN. TIMES, Aug. 13, 1992, at 22 (describing some of Bul-
garia's mining and land resources).
157. BULG. CONsT. art. 18, § 6; see supra note 151.
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Again, however, the communist background of Bulgaria and the
strong representation that the Socialist Party'5" still maintains in
the legislature 19 raise concerns that the failed communist ideology
might resurface at a later date. Even if a democratically elected
government acts under this provision with good intentions,
problems are bound to arise. Actions that benefit society in the
short term may have devastating long-term drawbacks. 60
Other portions of the Bulgarian Constitution further threaten
the creation of sufficient private property rights. Article 21, for in-
stance, restricts the use of arable land solely to agricultural pur-
poses. 61 Although probably intended to help alleviate the current
food shortages, this provision ignores the law of comparative ad-
vantage.1 6 2 By constitutionally requiring that arable land be used
for agricultural purposes, Bulgaria has demonstrated an inflexibil-
ity that is not conducive to the proper operation of market forces.
Article 21 denies owners of arable land the opportunity to make
their own economic choices as to the most efficient use of their
land. This lack of choice quashes the entrepreneurial spirit and
perpetuates inefficient allocation of resources.
158. "Socialist Party" is currently the fashionable name in Eastern Europe for the former
communist parties, and Bulgaria is no exception. Longworth, supra note 103, at C1.
159. The Bulgarian Socialist Party currently holds 106 out of the 240 seats in the legisla-
ture. Bulgaria; In Business, Just, ECONOMiST, Nov. 16, 1991, at 64. The Socialists occupy
just four seats fewer than the Union of Democratic Forces, Bulgaria's reformist party. Id.
160. For example, freezing prices and guaranteeing jobs will likely be an attractive short-
term solution to the inevitable problems Bulgaria will face. However, this approach to the
transition to capitalism may have tremendous long-term economic drawbacks. See supra
notes 146-50 and accompanying text.
161. BULG. CONST. art. 21, § 2. The full text of Article 21 states:
(1) The land is a basic national resource and benefits from the special protec-
tion of the state and society.
(2) Arable land may be used exclusively for agricultural purposes. Changes in
its use are permitted only when based on proven need, in accordance with con-
ditions and procedures defined by the law.
Id. art. 21.
162. The law of comparative advantage was formulated in 1817 by David Ricardo and
states: "[I]t is better for people to specialize in those activities in which their advantage over
other people is greatest or in which their disadvantages compared to others are the small-
est." RUFFIN & GREGORY, supra note 6, at 58-59. The law of comparative advantage applies
to international trade as well as to individual economic systems. For example, if a country
has a large supply of labor relative to capital, it will be more efficient for that country to
produce labor-intensive goods than capital-intensive goods. Id. at 449.
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Potential investment opportunities in Bulgaria are further com-
plicated by Article 22, which prohibits foreign ownership of land.6 3
Such a provision hardly comports with the ideals one would expect
to find in a newly adopted constitution of a country starving for
foreign investment. Without the ability to obtain permanent prop-
erty interest in land, foreign investors will likely be discouraged
from undertaking long-term investments in Bulgaria. Article 22
provides a company considering investment in Eastern Europe an-
other reason to opt for a country other than Bulgaria.
Albania6 4
The Albanian Constitution contains several articles regarding
property rights that will have a significantly negative impact on
the domestic economy Article 12 will undoubtedly prove most dis-
turbing to foreign investors; it not only claims all land and natural
resources for the state, but also grants the government control over
the railroads and the major means of communication." 5 This arti-
cle demonstrates a complete lack of commitment to capitalist ide-
ology and will clearly drive potential investors away from Al-
bania. "'
163. BULG. CONST. art 22, § 1. The full text of Article 22 states:
(1) Foreigners and foreign juridical persons may not acquire the right of land
ownership unless legally inherited. In such cases, they must transfer such own-
ership to someone else.
(2) Under conditions stipulated by law, foreigners and foreign juridical persons
may acquire user rights, building rights, and other real rights.
Id. art. 22.
164. As of this writing, Albania has still not adopted a final constitution. The analysis m
this section, therefore, is based on ALB. CONST. (Draft No. 2, 1991).
165. Id. art. 12. The full text of Article 12 states:
The land and underground resources, the mines, forests, waters, natural re-
sources of energy, means of communication of national importance, means of
railway transportation, telecommunications, radio and TV stations, and cine-
matography are the property of the state.
Alienation or co-ownership of each of the above objects, with the exception
of the land, is permitted only in accordance with law.
Id.
166. As with Bulgaria, the mining of natural resources is potentially Albania's most lucra-
tive industry. See supra notes 122-24, 156 and accompanying text. Government control over
this sector of the economy severely limits the number of attractive investments available to
foreigners.
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Article 12 suffers from the same flaws as Article 18 of the Bulga-
rian Constitution,167 and more. In addition to claiming all natural
resources as state property, Article 12 declares that all land is
property of the state."6" This article contemplates a staggering role
for the Albanian government in controlling the economy In order
to invest in Albania, a foreign company must first conduct a signif-
icant amount of business with the government-the sole supplier
of all land and natural resources. This scenario does not present an
ideal bargaining position for Western businesses; it forces investors
to contract with an unstable foreign government with a monopoly
over the most basic resources. Article 12 will erode the price sys-
tem in Albania and will lead to inefficient choices regarding how
best to utilize scarce resources.1
69
Paragraph 2 of Article 12 appears to contemplate the govern-
ment's surrendering some portion of the property interests claimed
in Paragraph 1.170 However, such a transfer of property will do lit-
tle to correct the problems associated with the first paragraph's ex-
tensive claim to ownership. First, Paragraph 2 specifically excludes
land which therefore will remain exclusively in the hands of the
state.17 ' In addition, the government is under no affirmative obliga-
tion to privatize the items listed in Paragraph 1. Even if the gov-
ernment chose to do so, there is no guarantee that the denationali-
zation would be organized in an economically responsible fashion.
The very fact that the government anticipates an active role in the
regulation of future alienation and co-ownership of property plants
the seeds of inefficiency at the most fundamental level of economic
development. Without the ability to transfer a property interest
freely, an investor's ability to realize a return on his investment is
severely limited. In addition, restraints on alienation result in
property's being put to unproductive uses by a current owner who
is unable to transfer the land to an individual who can use the
property more efficiently
167. See supra notes 151, 154-60 and accompanying text.
168. ALE. CONST. art. 12, para. 1 (Draft No. 2); see supra note 165.
169. The choices on how to utilize resources will be inefficient because they will be
reached as a result of an economic judgment made by a state bureaucracy, not by free-
market forces.
170. See ALE. CONST. art. 12, para. 2 (Draft No. 2); see supra note 165.
171. ALE. CONsT. art. 12, para. 2 (Draft No. 2).
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The drafters of the Albanian Constitution commit the same mis-
take as Bulgaria by restricting the use of arable land to agricul-
tural purposes. 17 2 Although the restriction can be overridden with
the approval of the appropriate state regulatory body,1 73 this type
of excessive state involvement in economic affairs is exactly what
these emerging countries need to avoid. Albania should not dictate
to its people the uses to which they must put their land.
Article 15 presents a related problem by restricting private initi-
ative to activities that "do [ I not infringe upon the interests of
society ,1"'7 This standard is unnecessarily broad and could se-
verely restrict legitimate economic activity 75 This article places
the power to make economic decisions with the government in-
stead of with individual economic actors. 17 6 Individuals in society
can determine their own best interests far better than a bureaucrat
in Tirana.
Albania must sever the ties between government and the econ-
omy The advantages of the invisible hand will benefit society but
capitalism must first be set in motion by freeing up the price sys-
tem, limiting government involvement in the economy, and al-
lowing individuals to make their own economic decisions.
Romania
Article 41 of the Romanian Constitution contains the major pro-
visions that will affect property rights in the emerging capitalist
system.177 Although these provisions should prove more satisfac-
tory to investors than the provisions contained in the constitutions
172. Id. art. 13, para. 2 ("Arable land can be used for purposes other than cultivation only
upon the approval of the appropriate state organs."); see supra notes 161-62 and accompa-
nying text (discussing a similar provision in the Bulgarian Constitution).
173. ALB. CONST. art. 13, para. 2 (Draft No. 2).
174. Id. art. 15, para. 2. ("Private initiative is free, on the condition that it does not in-
fringe upon the interests of society.").
175. AMERICAN BAR Ass'N CENT. & E. EUROPEAN LAW INITIATIVE, ANALYSIS OF THE DRAFT
CONSTITUTION OF ALBANIA 7 (1991) [hereinafter ALBANIAN CONSTITUTION ANALYSIS].
176. See supra notes 72-81 and accompanying text (discussing the consequences of de-
priving individuals of economic choice and placing that power with a central state agency).
177. Article 41 states:
Protection of private property
(1) The right of property, as well as the claims upon the State are guaran-
teed. The content and limitations of these rights shall be established by law.
1392 [Vol. 34:1367
1993] EASTERN EUROPE - CONSTITUTIONAL REFORM 1393
of Bulgaria and Albania, they are far from perfect. Stability of the
right to own private property is the key factor in establishing a
successful market economy in Eastern Europe; 8 Article 41 simply
does not fulfill this requirement.
Section 1 of Article 41 is the primary roadblock. Although it es-
tablishes the right to private property, the qcope of that right is to
be determined by statute.17 9 The danger of this infirmity is clear:
by merely passing a statute, the legislature can alter citizens' fun-
damental property rights. This presents a risk to an investor be-
cause a simple swing in the majority control in the legislature
could significantly affect one's property interest and undermine in-
vestment return.8 0 The manifest uncertainty that this provision
creates therefore diminishes the long-term attractiveness of
Romania to foreign investors.
(2) Private property shall be equally protected by law, irrespective of its
owner. Aliens and stateless persons may not acquire the right of land
ownership.
(3) No one may be expropriated, except on justified grounds of public utility
against proper and fair compensation paid in advance in accordance with the
provisions of the law.
(4) For such projects of general interest, the public authorities are entitled to
use the subsoil of any real estate (land or house property), with the obligation
to pay compensation to its owner for the damages caused to the soil, crops or
buildings, as well as other damages imputable to the authorities.
(5) Compensations provided under paragraphs 3 and 4 shall be agreed upon
with the owner, or by the decision of the court, unless a settlement can be
reached.
(6) The right of property is binding to the observance of duties relating to
environmental protection and ensurance of good neighbourhood, as well as of
other duties that, in accordance with the law or custom, are incumbent upon
the owner.
(7) Legally acquired property (assets) may not be confiscated. Legality of
acquirement shall be presumed.
(8) Any goods intended for, used for, or resulting from a criminal offence or
breach of law may be confiscated only in accordance with the provisions of the
law.
RoM. CONsT. art. 41.
178. See supra notes 142-43 and accompanying text.
179. Rom. CONsT. art. 41, § 1; see supra note 177.
180. A swing in the control of the legislative branch is a distinct possibility given the
political turmoil and continued economic problems in Romania. See Maass, supra note 2, at
A15.
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In section 2 of Article 41, Romania commits the same mistake as
Bulgaria' 8 ' by prohibiting foreigners from owning land. 8 ' Such
protectionist measures will severely damage the Romanian econ-
omy's chance for a successful recovery The prudent course for the
emerging Eastern European countries is to permit free trade and
remove all barriers to foreign investment in the region. Labor costs
in the Balkan states are extremely low, 83 making investment in
labor-intensive manufacturing relatively attractive. The Balkan
states need to capitalize on this comparative advantage if they
hope to become players in the world economy Lowering the barri-
ers to entry into the Balkan states should attract investors looking
for a launching pad into Western European markets. The resultant
influx of hard currency into the Balkan states could expand do-
mestic consumption. Section 2 of Article 41 essentially creates a
needless barrier to entry that will only steer investment capital
away from Romania.
Article 135 of the Romanian Constitution also expressly vests all
property rights in minerals and raw materials in the state.18 4 The
Romanian Constitution's allocation of property rights to the state
proves more troublesome than similar allocation in Bulgaria and
Albania when section 4 of Article 135 is read in light of section 4 of
Article 41, which allows the state to use the subsoil of any property
with an obligation to pay only for damages to the soil, buildings, or
crops.' "5 This section could allow the government to mine natural
resources from an individual's property while paying for only dam-
age to the soil, rather than the value of the resources. Because
Romania's greatest investment opportunity may be its natural re-
181. See supra note 163 and accompanying text.
182. ROM. CONST. art 41, § 2; see supra note 177.
183. Cooper & Shapiro, supra note 101, at 93.
184. Rom. CONsT. art. 135, § 4. The full text of Article 135, section 4 states:
Subsoil resources of any nature, ways of communication, the air space, wa-
ters that can generate motive force or can be used for the public interest,
beaches, territorial sea, natural resources of the economic zone and the conti-
nental shelf, as well as other assets established by law, shall make the exclusive
object of public property.
Id. This provision has the same faults as Article 18, section 1 of the Bulgarian Constitution,
and Article 12 of the Albanian Constitution. See supra notes 154-56, 167-71 and accompa-
nying text.
185. RoM. CONST. art. 41, § 4; see supra note 177.
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sources,1s6 governmental control of these resources is bound to
scare investors away
Section 6 of Article 41187 creates additional regulatory hurdles
deterring foreign investment in Romania. This provision makes
one's right to private property subject to environmental and "good
neighbor[ ]" concerns.""' The policy justifications underlying this
provision, while noble, simply do not make sound economic sense.
In order to protect and clean up its environment, Romania should
first strengthen its economy and attract foreign investment. The
wealth generated from economic growth can then be used to clean
up the environment and invest in more environmentally sound
production technologies.189 With respect to the "good neighbor"
provision, as discussed with Article 15 of the Albanian Constitu-
tion,190 society is capable of making its own choices regarding its
own best interest. Through the decisions of millions of individuals
considering only their best interests, the free market will allocate
resources according to their most desirable and efficient uses.
Establishment of Capitalist Ideology
The treatment of property rights in the new constitutions of
Bulgaria, Albania, and Romania will likely have a negative effect
on the prosperity of the emerging free market. Economics, how-
ever, is far from an exact science, and more than one factor will
affect the ultimate success of capitalism in Eastern Europe. The
constitution of a country, however, defines its basic political and
economic ideology and will therefore impact significantly on future
economic growth and political stability In determining the "con-
stitutional" climate for the establishment of free market economies
in the Balkan states, this section examines the tension between
capitalist and communist principles present in each of the three
countries. This political tension renders uncertain the ultimate
186. See Carol J. Williams, Despite Resources, Romania Faces a Rough Road to Eco-
nomic Recovery, LA. TIMES, June 17, 1990, at As.
187. Rom. CONST. art. 41, § 6; see supra note 177.
188. RoM. CONsT. art. 41, § 6.
189. James Sheehan, Now Not to Come Clean?, WASH. TIMES, Jan. 19, 1992, at B4.
Sheehan quotes Russian deputy minister of nature protection, Alexander Bazykrn, who
points out that " '[r]ich countries are relatively clean, while poor countries are dirty.'" Id.
190. See supra notes 174-76 and accompanying text.
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constitutional commitment these countries must make actively to
pursue a true free market economy
The remnants of communism present in Bulgaria's new constitu-
tion extend beyond its treatment of private property ownership.
The constitution provides for numerous "positive rights" 191 that
the government is responsible for providing to its citizens.'92 Given
the surviving representation of communist ideology in Bulgaria, 93
the constitution inclusion of several provisions that exemplify the
communist political philosophy is not surprising. Foreign investors
looking for capitalist opportunities will likely be discouraged by
these provisions for fear of both political instability94 and heavy
tax burdens. 95
The positive-rights provisions found in the Bulgarian Constitu-
tion are merely one indication that the political horizon has not
been cleansed completely of socialist and communist ideology Nu-
merous provisions demonstrate a markedly pro-labor ideology "I
Although many of these provisions were even stronger in an earlier
191. The U.S. Constitution is almost unanimously interpreted as a charter of negative
liberties as opposed to a list of positive rights. See, e.g., DeShaney v. Winnebago County
Dep't of Social Servs., 489 U.S. 189 (1989). In other words, the Constitution lays out restric-
tions on government power, rather than listing the duties that government must live up to.
192. See, e.g., BULG. CONST. art. 51, § 1 ("Citizens have the right to social security and
social assistance."); id. art. 52, § 1 ("Citizens have the right to health insurance and to
free medical services "); id. art. 53, § 1 ("The right to education is universal."); id. art.
55 ("Citizens have the right to a healthy and favorable environment ").
193. As noted, the Socialist Party in Bulgaria holds only four fewer seats than the Re-
formist Party in the legislature. See supra note 159 and accompanying text.
194. Political instability will probably be a problem in Eastern Europe for some time to
come, but these communist-based principles will exacerbate the problem by promising to
satisfy the basic needs of the citizens when the government has no ability to deliver. Politi-
cal instability will increase because a government that fails to deliver on its promises loses
popular legitimacy.
195. The constitutional provisions discussed in this section all place a tremendous finan-
cial strain on a government that is already bankrupt. See Girard C. Steichen, Bulgaria Slips
Deeper into Economic Crisis, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, Mar. 5, 1991, at 5 (documenting the
fiscal woes of the Bulgarian government). Even as the market economy develops, foreign
investors are likely to be wary of doing business in Bulgaria knowing they will have to sup-
port extensive social programs.
196. See, e.g., BULG. CONST. art. 16 ("The law guarantees and protects labor.); id. art. 48,
§ 1 ("Citizens have the right to work. The state is concerned with providing conditions for
the exercise of this right."); id. art. 48, § 5 ("Workers and employees have the right to
healthy and safe working conditions "); id. art. 50 ("Workers and employees have the
right to strike ").
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draft of the constitution, 197 they still provide a strong economic in-
centive for a corporation to seek a less labor-friendly base of
operation.
The more optimistic observer of the events in Bulgaria would
likely point to Article 19, which declares that the national economy
is to be based on free economic initiative."' This single article,
however, clearly conflicts with the numerous other articles in the
new constitution that contemplate a government actively involved
in economic matters."' This tension creates uncertainty, and un-
certainty severely diminishes the attractiveness of investment op-
portunities for foreigners.
Beyond its unsatisfactory treatment of property rights, the new
Albanian Constitution contains a significant number of provisions
that grant positive rights to the citizens.200 It also endorses other
basic tenets of communist ideology 201 The implied rejection of
true capitalist principles makes investment in Albania an extreme
risk because the government seems prepared to perpetuate the ex-
istence of an unprofitable economic system.
Positive-rights provisions pervade Albania's constitution to a
greater extent than Bulgaria's.0 2 In addition to guaranteeing free
health care203 and education,0 4 the Albanian Constitution entitles
citizens to recreation after work and a paid annual holiday 20 5 As
197. See, e.g., BULG. CONST. art. 14, § 1 (Draft, 1991) ("The state shall protect labour as a
source of private and public wealth."); id. § 2 ("Every citizen shall have the duty of assist-
ing in a manner he finds fit and within his means the material and intellectual progress of
society.").
198. BULG. CONST. art. 19, § 1.
199. See id. arts. 18, 20-22, 51-55.
200. See, e.g., ALB. CONST. art. 33 (Draft No. 2, 1991) ("guarantee[ing] the necessary ma-
terial means of living in old age"); id. art. 34 ("guarantee[ing] free necessary medical
service").
201. The American Bar Association's Central and East European Law Initiative analysis
of the Albanian Constitution found that "[t]he tensions between state control and the con-
cepts inherent in a free enterprise system are not adequately resolved." ALBANIAN CONSTITU-
TION ANALYSIS, supra note 175, at 7.
202. See ALB. CONsT. arts. 19-22, 32, 34, 38 (Draft No. 2).
203. Id. art. 34 ("The state guarantees free necessary medical service to its citizens and
free treatment in the country's health institutions.").
204. Id. art. 38 ("Citizens enjoy the right to education. Education is organized and di-
rected by the state and is open to all and is free.").
205. Id. art. 32 ("Citizens are entitled to recreation after work. Work time, per day and
per week, as well as a paid annual holiday, are set by law.").
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previously discussed, these positive-rights provisions will force the
state to impose a heavy tax burden on companies conducting busi-
ness in Albania. 06 Furthermore, the political legitimacy of the gov-
ernment will surely suffer if the guarantees are not met.
The real danger in Albania, however, lies beyond the positive-
rights issue and concerns the express adoption of communist eco-
nomic principles. Articles 19 and 20 are so fundamentally flawed,
and will have such a negative impact upon the economic develop-
ment of Albania, that they deserve specific mention. Article 19 in-
structs the state to plan "the entire economic and social activity"
of the nation.0 7 This provision diametrically opposes the princi-
ples of capitalism and will deter any investor from seriously con-
sidering opportunities in Albania. Forcing the investor to produce
goods in accordance with a state plan entirely eliminates the pros-
pects for a fruitful return on one's investment.20 8
Article 20 only exacerbates the problems created by Article 19.
Article 20 grants the state control over internal and foreign
trade."" It further increases the state's involvement in economic
affairs as established under Article 19 and demonstrates adherence
to communist principles of economic planning and control.210 The
danger of Article 20 turns on the concept of "control." Even the
governments of capitalist countries exercise some control over for-
eign and domestic trade, 211 but generally, this regulatory control
impinges on economic freedom without suffocating it. The notion
of control expressed in Article 20, however, appears to be far more
expansive. One need look no further than Article 19 to infer that
206. See supra notes 194-95 and accompanying text.
207. ALB. CONST. art. 19 (Draft No. 2) ("The state attends to planning the entire economic
and social activity and to harmonizing national and local interests, with a view to meeting
the material and cultural needs of the society and strengthening the independence and de-
fense of the country.").
208. The system of economic planning that Albania's constitution calls for appears to be a
complete adherence to its communist past. Such a system will undoubtedly lead to failure
again. See supra notes 72-81 and accompanying text.
209. ALB. CONST. art. 20 (Draft No. 2) ("The state exercises control over internal and
foreign trade.").
210. Id.
211. E.g., U.S. CoNsT. art. I, § 8, cls. 1, 3 (providing Congressional authority to tax and
regulate foreign commerce); 29 U.S.C. §§ 651-678 (1988) (providing government regulation
of occupational health and safety conditions); id. §§ 201-219 (providing federal minimum
wage and overtime labor protections).
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the control anticipated by Article 20 will extend to almost every
facet of Albania's economy 212 The net result of Articles 19 and 20
will undoubtedly be excessive state entanglement in the economy
that will not only deter investors, but will perpetuate the economic
catastrophe in Albania.
Romania's new constitution also sends conflicting messages as to
the country's commitment to free market principles. The uncer-
tainty caused by this lack of a clearly defined economic ideology
will injure Romania's chances of attracting foreign investment. In-
vestors will doubtless delay large-scale or long-term investments in
Romania until they are more certain of the economic outlook in
the country,
Article 134 of the Romanian Constitution endorses the notion of
a free market economy, but it also contains several provisions that
will deeply entangle the government in the new economic sys-
tem.21 Article 134 calls for the state to stimulate factors of produc-
tion, protect the national interest in hard currency, protect the en-
vironment, exploit natural resources in accordance with the
national interest, and raise the quality of life. 14 As economic con-
ditions in Romania worsen, as they undoubtedly will, the govern-
ment will find it extremely difficult to explain to the citizens that
the abstract concept of a free market is worth a short-term de-
crease in the quality of life. The specific burdens that these obliga-
212. Articles 21 and 22 provide further support to the proposition that communist ideol-
ogy remains a powerful force in the Albanian political and economic arenas. Article 21 em-
braces Marx's theory that "work" is the foundation of all wealth and value in society. ALB.
CONST. art. 21 (Draft No. 2). Article 22 is the codification of Marx's philosophy that every
citizen has a duty to contribute to society to the best of his ability. Id. art. 22.
213. See Rom. CONsT. art. 134. The full text of Article 134 states:
(1) Romania's economy is a free market economy.
(2) The state shall provide for:
a) the freedom of trade, protection of loyal competition, stimulation of every
factor of production;
b) protection of national interests in economic, financial and hard currency
activities;
c) encouragement of national scientific research;
d) exploitation of natural resources in accordance with the national interest;
e) recovery and protection of the environment and preservation of ecological
balance;
f) the necessary conditions to raise the quality of life.
Id.
214. Id.
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tions place on the state will surely take precedence over any theo-
retical experiment with a laissez-faire economic policy
The problems associated with Article 134, however, are quite
manageable relative to the problems encountered m the new Bul-
garian and Albanian constitutions. Romania does not embark on
mass economic and social planning as does Albania, 15 nor does it
contain paraphrased references to Marxist ideology 216 Romania
deserves credit for moving further away from its communist eco-
nomic past than its Balkan neighbors, but Romania must go even
further. Freeing market forces will be painful in the short term,
but the countries of Eastern Europe must take this first step
boldly Hanging on to the nation's ideological past will surely
poison the successful operation of a capitalist system.
If the domestic economy does take a serious turn for the worse,
Romania's problems will be compounded by the numerous posi-
tive-rights provisions in the new constitution.217 These provisions
will create an enormous tax strain on the economy and thus dis-
courage foreigners from doing business in Romania.218 These bold
promises also threaten the legitimacy of the government if the
privileges are not provided to the citizens.
Outside of the problems with ambiguous property rights, the cli-
mate for investment in Romania is most seriously damaged by the
high expectations set by the government. As expectations are not
met, people become restless, and restlessness does not attract or
promote business. If capitalism fails to do a better job than com-
munism in providing food and shelter to the people, the citizens'
calls for a return to the old system will be imminent.219
CONCLUSION
The economies of Eastern Europe are in a state of total despair.
It was this economic strife that began the reform movement three
215. See supra notes 207-12 and accompanying text.
216. See supra notes 196-97 and accompanying text (Bulgaria); supra note 212 (Albania).
217. See, e.g., ROM. CONST. art. 32 (right to free education); id. art. 33 (right to free health
care); id. art. 43 (right to a decent standard of living).
218. See also supra notes 194-95 and accompanying text (predicting similar consequences
in Bulgaria); supra notes 202-06 and accompanying text (predicting the strains in Albania).
219. See supra notes 1-3 and accompanying text (discussing souring attitudes toward cap-
italism in several Eastern European nations).
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years ago, and it is this economic strife that will be the death knell
for capitalism if conditions do not improve. Unfortunately, the new
constitutions adopted by the Balkan states do not provide a
healthy environment for free market forces to operate. The new
constitutions fail to provide the citizens of these countries with the
full thrust of individual incentive necessary to spur entrepreneur-
ship. In addition, these constitutions contemplate an inflexible net-
work of government involvement in the economy that will signifi-
cantly deter Western investment. The likely effect of these core
deficiencies is weak economic growth, which will inevitably lead to
political instability One need only witness the events in Russia
this year, when the conservative Parliament tried to remove Presi-
dent Boris Yeltsin from power, to understand this inherent con-
nection between economics and politics.
Robert C. Juelke
